Date: March 3, 1973

Time: Unknown between 1:10 pm and 2:07 pm

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger, Julienne L. Pinneau, and George P. Shultz; the

White House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.

Introduction

Pinneau’s departure

[Photograph session]

Pinneau’s work with administration

Pinneau’s new job

-United States Information Agency [USIA]

-James Keogh

Meeting with Kissinger

Pinneau left at 1:12 pm.

Kissinger’s meeting with Quadriad members

-Length

US monetary policy

Kissinger’s knowledge

-Floating exchange regime

-Intervention

-Willy Brandt’s letter

-Europe

-Common float position

-Impact on US

-European integration, world stability

-Kissinger’s viewpoint

-Common float

-Political impact of devaluation

-Speculation, devaluation

-Perception of US weakness

-Consultation with US

-US intervention

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Statement to Brandt

-US procedural objection

-Basis for later action

-Objection to Brandt’s letter

-Edward R. G. Heath

-Reply to president

-Shultz’s telephone call to Anthony P. L. Barber

-Position on common floating of currency

-US reaction to common float proposal

-Reply to Brandt

-Exchange rates

-General compared with unilateral action

-Impact of float on Japan

-Need for consultation

-Intervention to defend US exchange rate

-Minimum demand

-Consultation

-US options

-Common float

-US objections

-Paul A. Volcker

-Intervention

-Acquiescence in European integration

-US concerns

-Brandt’s letter

-US interests

-European integration

-Benefit to world security

-Conversation with Heath

Floating of currency

-Kissinger

-Political implications of float

-Europe

-Consultation with US

-Options

Europe integration

-US position

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Wording of statement

-Support for integration

-Europe, Atlantic

-Need for consultation with US, Japan

-Monetary situation

-Compared to US-USSR initiatives

-European actions

-Unilateral, consultation

-Japan’s interests

-US actions

Exchange rates

-US course of action

-Massive intervention in currency markets

-Floating exchange regime

-Shultz, Herbert Stein

-US interests

-Devaluation

-International reaction

-Smithsonian Agreement

-February 12, 1973 devaluation

-US weakness

-Floating exchange regime

-Economists’ views

-Progress

-August 1971, February 193

-Milton Friedman

-Support

President’s letter to Brandt and Heath

-Active US policy

-Japan, Europe

-US devaluation

-Passive US policy

-European integration

-Substitute for Atlantic, world cooperation

-Consultation with US

Intervention

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Shultz’s opposition

-Risks

-Arthur F. Burns

-West Germany

-Formal US devaluation

-Congress, International Monetary Fund [IMF]

-Dollar reserves

-West Germany

-Exchange rate parity fluctuations

-Japan

-Burns’s recommendations

-US bargaining position

-Borrowing against West German Mark

-US intervention to defend exchange rate

-Common float

-Failure

-National float

-Weaknesses

-West Germany

-US intervention

-Obligation

-Smithsonian Agreement

-Letter to Brandt

-Devaluation statement

-Congress

-Critique

-Support for float

-West Germany

-Belief in US non-intervention

-New York bankers

-Alfred Hayes

-Support for US intervention

-Reasons

-Stable currency markets

-Speculation

European integration

-Kissinger’s viewpoint

-Desirability

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Atlantic unity

-US intervention in currency markets

-Moves toward common currency

-US intervention in currency markets

-West German participation

-West Germany’s position

-Cooperation with US

-Common float

US intervention

-Impact on European moves for common currency

-Delay

Europe’s common currency

-Difficulty

-Exchange rate parity

-Italy, Great Britain

-Crisis

-German cooperation with US

US intervention

-Economic impact

US policy toward common float

-Kissinger’s concerns over inaction

-European independence, unity

-Impact on Atlantic alliance

-Kissinger’s recommendation

-Letter from President

-Atlantic unity

-Alerting Japan

-US intervention to defend exchange rate

-Kissinger’s recommendation

-US support of Europe’s proposal

-US interests

-Shultz

-US rejection of fait acompli

-Brandt’s letter

-Heath’s response

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Japan

European moves toward common float

-France

-Anti-American rhetoric

-European independence

-West German actions

-Belief in US non-intervention

-Great Britain

-Floating exchange

-Support for fixed exchange in Europe

President’s letter to Brandt, Heath

-Intervention options

-Impact on terms of trade

-Congress

-Reaction

-Currency swaps

-Risks

-Costs

-Burns’s forthcoming testimony

-Exchange rate parity

-Price of gold

-Non-intervention option

-US bargaining position

-European moves toward common float

-Disagreement

-Failure

-West Germany

-Consultation with US

-Defense of rate parity

-France’s position compared to US

Shultz’s view of US intervention

-Burns’s position

-Flexible exchange rates

-Burns’s position

-Non-intervention

-Leverage

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Flexible negotiating position

US policy toward common float

-Political implications

-Domestic

-New York bankers

-View of nation

-US leadership

-US interest in a divided Europe

-President’s letter to Brandt

-Need for consultations

-Europe’s skepticism

-Independent action

-US intervention

-Conditions

-Europe’s response

-Heath, Japan

-US assertion of leadership

-Consultation with US

-Leverage in other negotiations

-Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR], Nuclear

agreement

US relations with Europe

-US economic strengths

-US interests

Kissinger’s interpretation of Brandt’s letter

-Heath

-Deal

-US intervention

-Europe’s rejection

-West Germany

-Need to float currency

-Brandt’s promise

-Blame on US

US intervention

-Imposition compared to offer

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Europe’s response

-Float, consultation with US

-US negotiating leverage

President’s letter to Brandt

-Support for European integration

-Impact on Atlantic alliance

-Unilateral decisions

-US, Japan

-Common float

-US input

-Intervention

-Japan

-Brandt

-Agreement without US support

-Dealings with France

-Heath

-Nuclear issues

-Dealings with President

US intervention in monetary system

-Shultz’s viewpoint

-Exchange rates

-Need for convertibility

-Equilibrium

-France’s opposition

-US military and aid operations, investments

-Separation of trade from monetary problems

President’s letters to Heath, Brandt, and Japan

-Importance

-Kissinger’s recommendations

-European alternatives

-Responses by Europeans

-Intervention

-Advantages of European initiative

-Question about intervention

-US responses

-Advantage of European initiative

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

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-Compensation for US

-Europe’s position specified

-Intervention, float

-Intervention

European float of currency

-Workability

-Chances

-West Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg float

-Workability

-Chances

-Brandt

-Problems

-Great Britain’s response

-US bailout

-European integration

-Failure

-US response

Letter to Brandt

-Alternatives to common float

-US support

European integration

-US policy toward

-Official

-Unofficial

-Steps toward common economic policy

-Action only by pressure

-US support

-Economic compared to defense integration

-Working against US interests

President’s letter to Brandt

-Draft

-Kissinger and Shultz

Shultz’s trip

-Europe and USSR

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

-Advisability

-Length

-Energy, tax, trade issues

-Postponement

-Shultz’s return from Europe

-Shultz’s trip to USSR

-Impact

Most Favored Nation status [MFN] for USSR

-Helmut (“Hal”) Sonnenfeldt’s concern

-Shultz’s talks with Jacob K. Javits

-Trade bill

-Jackson Amendment

-Senate supporters

-President’s request for authority

-Congressional veto power

-Advantages

-Jackson Amendment

-Javits’s recommendations

-Sonnenfeldt’s concern

-Kissinger’s critique

-USSR

-President’s support

Shultz’s trip

-Advantages

-Consultation with Europeans

-Problems

-Congressional vetoes

-Kissinger’s viewpoint

-Postponement

-Letters

Kissinger left at 2:07 pm.

William E. Simon

-Treasury Department

-Abilities

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Tape Subject Log

(rev. June-2010)

Shultz left at 2:07 pm.